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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mark Charles Wilson appeals from his judgment of conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm, and his enhanced sentenced for being a persistent violator having two
prior felony convictions. At trial, the State offered evidence of two previous convictions for a
“Mark Charles Wilson”: one in the State of Michigan, in 1990; and one in Custer County, Idaho,
in 2006.

On the primary charge, the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Wilson guilty of

unlawful possession of the firearm; and on the persistent violator enhancement, the jury returned
a verdict finding he had two previous convictions.
The district court denied Mr. Wilson’s subsequent Criminal Rule 29 motions for
judgment acquittal, but sua sponte ordered a new trial on the persistent violator allegation. The
State subsequently filed supplemental discovery, listing additional evidence related to the prior
convictions that it intended to offer at the new trial. Mr. Wilson entered a conditional plea
admitting the persistent violator allegation, but expressly reserved his right to appeal the district
court’s prior rulings.
On appeal, Mr. Wilson claims there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict finding him guilty of the primary charge of unlawful possession of the firearm charge.
Specifically, he argues there was not sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Wilson was a convicted
felon at the time he possessed the firearm, since the State failed to present adequate proof to
identify Mr. Wilson as the person convicted in either of the two previous judgments of
conviction that it presented. Due to the insufficiency of the evidence, Mr. Wilson is entitled to a
judgment of acquittal on the primary charge of unlawful possession of a firearm.

1

Alternatively, Mr. Wilson argues the district court erred when it denied his motion for
acquittal on the persistent violator allegation. He argues that, even if there was sufficient
evidence to identify him as the person convicted in the judgments of conviction, the State’s
evidence was insufficient to establish that the Michigan conviction was for a felony, and
therefore insufficient to support a finding that he was a persistent violator.

Due to the

insufficiency of the evidence, Mr. Wilson was entitled to an acquittal on the State’s persistent
violator allegation. Accordingly, in the event this Court does not agree that Mr. Wilson is
entitled to an acquittal on the primary charge, Mr. Wilson respectfully asks this Court to reverse
the district court’s denial of his motion for acquittal on the persistent violator allegations, and to
remand his case for resentencing, without the persistent violator enhancement.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In February 2019, the State filed a Criminal Complaint charging Mr. Wilson with
unlawful possession of a firearm, 1 alleging he had previously been convicted of a felony.
(R. pp.11, 26.)

The State sought to subject Mr. Wilson to enhanced penalties as a “persistent

violator” by amending its pleadings to allege that Mr. Wilson had been convicted of two prior
felonies: a 2006 conviction in Custer County, Idaho; and a 1990 conviction from the State of
Michigan. (R., pp.98-99; Tr., p.50, Ls.10-25.)
Mr. Wilson pled not guilty and exercised his right to a jury trial. (R., pp.28-32.) The
district court conducted the trial in two parts: the first part tasked the State with proving its
primary charge, that Mr. Wilson was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the weapon; and
after the jury found him guilty, the second part tasked the State with proving its allegation that
1

In a separate case, CR-2018-94, Mr. Wilson was charged and convicted for the murder of
Patricia Brown using the same firearm. (PSI, p.3.) The State had originally filed the persistent
violator enhancement using the murder conviction as one of the two prior convictions.
(R., p.46.)
2

Mr. Wilson was convicted of two prior felonies, for the persistent violator enhancement.
(Tr., p.52, Ls.5-14.)
As to the primary charge of unlawful possession of a firearm, Mr. Wilson admitted to all
but one of the material elements; specifically, he admitted he knowingly possessed a firearm on
the date and in the place alleged.2 (See Tr., p.52, L.14 – p.53, L.8, p.99, Ls.3-7; R., pp.109, 133.)
This left the State with the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the sole remaining
element: that Mr. Wilson had previously been convicted of a felony. (R., p.109.) On that
element, the State presented evidence of two different prior convictions, the same prior
convictions it alleged for the persistent violator enhancement: a 2006 conviction in Idaho; and a
1990 conviction from the State of Michigan. (Tr., p.104, L.13 – 106, L.8; Exhibits, pp.1-8)
As proof of the 2006 Idaho conviction, the State offered “Exhibit 1,” which is a certified
copy of a “judgment and order of conviction” against a “Mark Charles Wilson,” and it is for a
crime identified as “battery with intent to commit serious felony, a felony.” (Tr., p.104, L.13;
Exhibits, pp.1-3.) The Exhibit displays a birthdate –

– and a ten-digit social

security number. (Exhibits, p. 1.)
As proof of the 1990 Michigan conviction, the State offered Exhibit 2, which is a
certified copy of a “commitment to jail.” (Tr., p.106, L.8; Exhibits, pp.4-5.) Exhibit 2 reflects
the conviction is for a “criminal sexual conduct, 2nd degree,” but does not indicate that such
crime is a felony. (Exhibits, pp.4-5.) The exhibit also reflects the conviction is against a “Mark
Charles Wilson,” residing at an address in Jackson, Michigan, and with a birthdate of
– which is the same birthdate for the “Mark Charles Wilson” in Exhibit 1, the Idaho

2

Based on these admissions, the district court granted Mr. Wilson’s motion in limine to preclude
the State from presenting evidence about the facts and circumstances surrounding the March 24,
2019, murder and gun possession charges. (R., p.109; Tr., p.52, Ls.8-14.)
3

judgment. (See Exhibits, pp.1, 4.) The exhibit contains no social security number or other
personal identifying information for the named defendant. (Exhibits, pp.4-5.)
Additionally, and over defense counsel’s objections, the State introduced Exhibit 3,
which is a printout of a webpage from the Michigan Legislature’s website, downloaded in 2019.
(Exhibits, pp.7-9; Tr., p.108, L.10.) The Exhibit purports to be an excerpt from the current
version of the Michigan Penal Code, specifically “750.520c, Criminal sexual conduct in the
second degree; felony.” (Exhibits, pp.7-9.) As counsel pointed out, the Exhibit contains the
current version of the Michigan statute, as amended in 2013; not the version that existed in 1990
when the Michigan conviction was entered. (Exhibits, pp.7-9; Tr., p.108, Ls.13-20.) The
Exhibit itself shows that since 1990, that subsection of the statute had been amended a total of
five times. (Exhibits, pp.8-9; Tr., p.115, L.22 – p.116, L.16.) On these grounds, defense counsel
objected to the admission of Exhibit 3; the district court overruled the objection, concluding the
objection went “to the weight of that document,” not to its admissibility. (Tr., p.109, Ls.3-10.)
The district court permitted the State’s witness to testify that, based on his reading of that statute,
the Michigan conviction was a felony conviction. (Tr., p.110, Ls.3-8.) In addition to the
exhibits, the State presented the testimony of Deputy Levi Maydole, who had been employed by
the Custer County Sheriff’s Department since 2001. (Tr., p.99, L.20 – p.114, L.21.) Deputy
Maydole testified he had known Mr. Wilson since 2001, “just from the community, maybe from
some casual contact.” (Tr., p.102, Ls.4-10.) The deputy also testified he was “aware” of
Mr. Wilson being charged in Custer County with the crime of “attempted strangulation.”
(Tr., p.100, Ls.13-20.)

He also testified he was “aware” of a guilty plea and sentencing

“occurring” in 2006 and that these were “occurring to Mr. Wilson.” (Tr., p.104, Ls.16-23.)
However, the deputy also testified he had no involvement in that case; he was not involved in the

4

investigation of that crime nor present at the plea or sentencing proceedings. (Tr., p.102, Ls.1424.) He provided no testimony that he had personal knowledge as to any specific charges, the
plea, or sentencing that were supposedly “occurring to Mr. Wilson. On the contrary, the deputy
specifically testified he had no independent knowledge about the information in the 2006
judgment of conviction, outside of what he was reading from the document in his hand.
(Tr., p.103, Ls.1-7.)
The State did not present any booking photo or other information connected with the
1990 Michigan conviction, the 2006 Idaho conviction, or for the arrest and booking on the
charges in the present case. (See generally, Exhibits, pp.1-9; Tr., p.98, L.15 – p.114, L.24.) The
State presented no independent evidence to establish Mr. Wilson’s birthdate, his social security
number, or his residence in 1989. (See generally, Exhibits, pp.1-9; Tr., p.98, L.15 – p.114,
L.24.) After the deputy’s testimony, the State rested. (Tr., p.114, L.24.)
Defense counsel moved for a partial judgment of acquittal with regard to the 1990
Michigan conviction. (Tr., p.115, Ls.2-3.) Specifically, counsel argued the State had failed
carry its burdens of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) that Mr. Wilson is the person
convicted in the 1990 Michigan case, and (2) the Michigan crime of conviction was a felony
under Michigan law in 1990. (Tr., p.115, L.22 – p.116, L.16.) The State responded that there
was sufficient evidence to go to the jury, asserting “the statute that’s been admitted” into
evidence shows that the Michigan crime is a felony. (Tr., p.116, L.18 – p.117, L.1.)
Additionally, the State argued that whether the Michigan conviction was a felony
conviction was a matter of law for the court to determine, not a matter for the jury. (Tr., p.118,
L.22 – p.119, L.9.) The State specifically requested the district court to instruct the jury that the
crime of conviction in the Michigan case was a felony under Michigan law. (Tr., p.118, L.22 –
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p.119, L.9.) Defense counsel repeatedly objected, arguing that the State bore the burden of
presenting the jury with evidence that proved the prior crimes were felonies, and that the State’s
evidence was legally insufficient as to the Michigan crime of conviction. (Tr., p.121, Ls.12-23,
p.125, Ls.21-25.) The district court agreed with the State and denied Mr. Wilson’s motion for
acquittal. (Tr., p.122, Ls.19-20.) The district court went on to modify the jury instructions, so
that the jury needed only to find that the State had proved Mr. Wilson was previously convicted
of a crime, but not that the crime was a felony.3 (Tr., p.124, L.19 – p.125, L.19; R., p.134 (Jury
Instruction No.23).)
The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Wilson guilty of the unlawful possession of
firearm. (R., p.140.) The district court proceeded directly to the second part of the trial, the
persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., p.148, Ls.13-17.) The State had no additional evidence.
(Tr., p.149, L.24 – p.150, L.5.) The jury returned a verdict finding that Mr. Wilson had two prior
convictions: criminal conduct, second degree, in 1990; and battery with intent to commit a
serious felony, in 2006. (R., p.141.)
Mr. Wilson timely filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Criminal Rule
29(c), on the persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.144, 148-51.) He argued, again, that the
State had failed in its burden of presenting the jury with evidence sufficient that Mr. Wilson was
the person convicted in the 1990 Michigan conviction, and that it failed in its burden of proving
the conviction was for a felony. (R., pp.144, 148-51.) The district court denied Mr. Wilson’s
motion for acquittal. (Tr., p.162, Ls.8-16.) However, the court conceded it made a mistake by
deciding that fact based on its own research, instead of instructing the jury to make that finding
3

The district court explained it had “looked into” the statute and had determined for itself that
the conduct was a felony at the time of conviction. (Tr., p.126, Ls.19-24.) The district court also
ruled that defense counsel was precluded from arguing to the jury that the evidence was
insufficient to prove the crime was a felony. (Tr., p.125, Ls.5-7.)
6

on the evidence presented. (Tr., p.163, Ls.12-25.) For that reason, the district court concluded
the jury’s verdict on the persistent violator enhancement “cannot stand” and at the State’s
suggestion, decided to construe4 Mr. Wilson’s motion to include an alternative motion for a new
trial, and ordered a new trial on the persistent violator allegation. (Tr., p.164, Ls.1-4; R., p.146.)
Prior to the date for the new trial, the State filed a “supplemental discovery response”
listing additional items of evidence it had since procured, and indicating the State’s intent to
introduce those items at the new trial. (Aug. R., pp.1-2.)5 Among the additional items of
evidence were booking photos and information related to the 1990 Michigan conviction, a copy
of the Michigan statute from the year 1989; and booking photos and information from Custer
County, Idaho. (Aug.R., p.2.)
Mr. Wilson subsequently entered a conditional plea admitting the persistent violator
allegation, expressly reserving his right to appeal any and all previous rulings of the district
court. (Tr., p.178, L.24 – p.179, L.4.) The district court accepted the plea and sentenced
Mr. Wilson as a persistent violator,6 imposing a term of fifteen years, with twelve years fixed, to
run consecutively to the sentence in his other case. (Tr., p.193, Ls.15-23; R., p.159.)
Mr. Wilson timely appealed. (R., p.167.)

4

Mr. Wilson’s motion for a judgment of acquittal did not include a request for new trial; the
suggestion of a new trial came from the State. (Tr., p.161, Ls.19-24.)
5
A Motion to Augment the Appellate Record to include this document is being filed
contemporaneously with the Appellant’s Brief.
6
Unlawful possession of a firearm carries a maximum prison term of five years imprisonment.
See I.C. § 18-3316. The persistent violator finding extended the maximum prison term to life.
I.C. § 19-2514.
7

ISSUES
I.

Is Mr. Wilson entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charge of unlawful possession of
a firearm, because the State failed present the jury with sufficient evidence that
Mr. Wilson was previously convicted of a felony?

II.

Should this Court reverse the district court’s denial of Mr. Wilson’s motion for judgment
of acquittal on the persistent violator allegation, because the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that Mr. Wilson had two prior felony convictions?

8

ARGUMENTS
I.
Mr. Wilson Is Entitled To A Judgment Of Acquittal On The Charge Of Unlawful Possession Of
A Firearm Because The State Failed Present The Jury With Sufficient Evidence That Mr. Wilson
Was Previously Convicted Of A Felony
A.

Introduction
Proof that Mr. Wilson had a prior felony conviction was an essential element of the

primary charge that he unlawfully possessed a weapon, and the State bore the burden of proving
this element beyond a reasonable doubt. At the trial, the State introduced as exhibits two prior
judgments of convictions: one was from the State of Michigan entered in 1990; and one from
Custer County, Idaho, entered in 2006. Both convictions were against a “Mark Charles Wilson,”
and both showed a birthdate of

; one of the exhibits contained a social security

number, and one showed an address in Jackson, Michigan, in 1990. (Exhibits, pp.1-7 (Exhibits
1, 2).) However, the State presented no evidence to identify Mr. Wilson as the person against
whom either of the two convictions was entered beyond a reasonable doubt. The State presented
no evidence of Mr. Wilson’s birthdate, social security number, or address in 1990; the State
presented no booking photos or other personal identifying information to connect Mr. Wilson
with either the 2006 conviction or the 1990 conviction. That Mr. Wilson shared the same name
as the persons in those convictions is not substantial evidence proving Mr. Wilson’s identify
beyond a reasonable doubt.
As such, Mr. Wilson is entitled to acquittal, and his judgment of conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm must be vacated.

9

B.

Standard Of Review
“On a complaint of insufficiency of evidence, the appropriate standard of review is

whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” State v. Bush,
131 Idaho 22, 32 (1997). The role of the reviewing court is to examine the supporting evidence,
not to reweigh the evidence. Id. All facts and inferences are to be construed in favor of
upholding the jury’s verdict. Id. Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to
sustain the jury’s verdict, the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal. Id.; accord State v. Ish,
161 Idaho 823, 825 (Ct. App. 2014). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable jury could have
relied upon it in determining that the allegation was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Parton 154 Idaho 588, 569 (2013); see also State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013)
(“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion.”)

If the appellate court determines the evidence is insufficient, the defendant is

entitled to acquittal. See State v. Calver, 155 Idaho 207, 210 (Ct. App. 2013).

C.

The Evidence Was Insufficient For The Jury To Find Mr. Wilson Guilty Of Unlawful
Possession Of A Firearm, Because The State Did Not Prove That He Had Been
Previously Convicted Of A Felony
Mr. Wilson admitted to knowingly possessing the firearm, leaving the State to prove, at

trial, the remaining essential element that he had a prior felony conviction. I.C. § 18-3316; ICJI
1410; (See Tr., p.52, L.14 – p.53, L.8, p.99, Ls.3-7; R., pp.109, 133.) When the prior conviction
is an essential element of the offense, the State bears the burden to establish the identity of the
defendant as the person previously convicted, beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Miller,
151 Idaho 828, 232-22 (2011); State v. Ish, 161 Idaho 823 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. McClain,
154 Idaho 742, 747 (Ct. App. 2012).
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Idaho’s appellate courts have held that “a certified copy of a judgment of conviction
bearing the same name as the defendant, with nothing more, is insufficient to establish the
identity of the person formerly convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Ish, 161 Idaho
823, 825 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 332 (Ct. App. 2006). On the
other hand, proof of “the same name and the same date of birth is sufficient to withstand a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge.” Id. (citing State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 569 (2013)
(emphasis by the Court in Ish).
The only evidence presented by the State to show that Mr. Wilson was the same person
as the defendant in the two judgments of conviction was the testimony of Deputy Maydole.
(Tr., p.99, L.20 – p.114, L.21.) Deputy Maydole testified he had known Mr. Wilson since 2001,
“just from the community, maybe from some casual contact.” (Tr., p.102, Ls.4-10.) The deputy
also testified he was “aware” of a charge against Mr. Wilson for “attempted strangulation.”
(Tr., p.100, Ls.13-20.) He said he was “aware” of the guilty plea and sentencing occurring” in
2006, and that these were “occurring to Mr. Wilson.” (Tr., p.104, Ls.16-23.) However, he
testified he had no involvement in that case; he was not involved in the investigation of the
allegations, nor was he present at the plea or sentencing proceedings. (Tr., p.102, Ls.14-24.)
When he was handed State’s Exhibit 1, the deputy agreed “this [is] for the crime that Mr. Wilson
pled guilty to in 2006,” but on cross-examination, he testified he had no independent knowledge
about the information in the judgment of conviction, outside of what he was reading from the
document in his hand. (Tr., p.103, Ls.1-7.) The deputy clarified that his knowledge that the
Idaho judgment pertained to Mr. Wilson was not based on his own personal recollection, but on
what was stated in the exhibit itself. (Tr., p.102, L.25 – p.103, L.7.) He testified he “knew” this
information only because he just read it on the document placed before him, and if he had not
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just read it, he probably would not have known it. (Tr., p.112, Ls.18-23.) The deputy offered
absolutely no testimony to connect Mr. Wilson to the 1990 Michigan conviction. (See generally
Tr., p.98, L.15 – p.114, L.24.)
The facts in this case are like those presented to the Idaho Court of Appeals in Medrain,
143 Idaho 329. There, the jury was evidently aware that defendant Medrain’s full name was
McGavin O. Medrain. Id. at 332. As proof of its allegation that Medrain had previously been
convicted of felonies, the State introduced judgments of conviction from 1996, for a “McGavin
O. Medrain,” which included a social security number and a date of birth. Id. The State argued it
was not required to present “mug shots” or any other evidence establishing Medrain’s identity as
the person referred to in the 1996 judgments of conviction. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected
the State’s argument, and concluded the evidence the State had submitted was legally
insufficient. The Court explained:
Although the judgments of conviction from 1996 depict a date of birth and social
security number, the State produced no evidence of Medrain’s social security
number and date of birth. Rather, the only evidence before the jury connecting
Medrain to the “McGavin O. Medrain” listed in the judgments of conviction was
the similarity between the two names. That Medrain bore the same name as the
person referred to in the judgments of conviction from 1996, with nothing more,
was legally insufficient to prove Medrain’s identity as that person beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 332.
Just as in Medrain, the State in this case produced no evidence of Mr. Wilson’s birthdate
or his social security number. (See generally Tr., p.98, L.15 – p.114, L.24.)

And just as in

Medrain, the State produced no “mug shots,” fingerprints, or other information from which the
jury could connect Mr. Wilson to either of the two prior convictions it had introduced. (See
generally Tr., p.98, L.15 – p.114, L.24.) In this case, both State’s exhibits contained the
birthdate of

. (Exhibits, pp.1-7.) However, independent of those exhibits, the State

12

presented no evidence of Mr. Wilson’s birthdate. Though the State attempted to bootstrap such
evidence from its only witness, Deputy Maydole, the deputy conceded he had no personal
knowledge, or recollection, of Mr. Wilson’s birthdate. The deputy testified he “knew”
Mr. Wilson’s birthdate only because “I read it when he was arrested on the [2018] charge
because I was the one booking him.” (Tr., p.111, Ls.19-21.) However, there was no 2018
booking information admitted as evidence at this trial, and the deputy conceded he did not know
Mr. Wilson’s birthdate, “other than I just now read it,” and that had he not just now read it, he
“wouldn’t have known it.” (Tr., p.112, Ls.15-23.)
Thus, as in Medrain and Ish, the evidence presented to the jury was legally insufficient to
prove Mr. Wilson was the same person referred to in the prior convictions beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because the evidence is legally insufficient on the essential element that Mr. Wilson was
previously convicted of a felony, Mr. Wilson’s conviction for unlawfully possessing a firearm
cannot be sustained, and he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal.

II
This Court Should Reverse The District Court’s Denial Of Mr. Wilson’s Motion For Judgment
Of Acquittal On The Persistent Violator Allegation, Because The Evidence Was Insufficient To
Support A Finding That Mr. Wilson Had Two Prior Felony Convictions
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wilson alternatively asks this Court to reverse the district court’s denial of his

Criminal Rule 29(c) motion for judgment of acquittal on the State’s persistent violator allegation.
To prove its persistent violator allegation, the State was required to prove Mr. Wilson had two
prior felony convictions. I.C. § 19-2514. As outlined in Section I, the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wilson was the same person as the person convicted in either
the Idaho or Michigan judgments of conviction. Mr. Wilson additionally argues that, even if
13

there was sufficient evidence to show Mr. Wilson was convicted of prior crimes, the State failed
to carry its burden of proving both prior crimes were felonies. Specifically, the State failed to
present sufficient evidence from which the jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
Michigan conviction for “criminal sexual conduct, second degree” was a felony under Michigan
law in 1990.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard for reviewing a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal under I.C.R. 29

is the same as for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence made for the first time
on appeal; the appellate court asks, “whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684 (2004); State v. Printz, 115 Idaho 566, 567 (Ct. App.1989); Cf.
State v. Clark, 161 Idaho 372, 374 (2016).7

In conducing this review, the appellate court

independently considers the evidence in the record and determines whether a reasonable mind
could conclude that the defendant’s guilt as to each essential element of the offense was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

7

The Clark opinion carries forward an apparent typographical error, insofar as it mistakenly
describes the standard of review. It mistakenly describes a standard requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the “material evidence of the offense,” 161 Idaho at 374, but the standard
should be stated as requiring proof of the “material elements the offense.” Clark takes it quote
from State v. Grube, 126 Idaho 377, 386 (1994), which misquotes Printz, 115 Idaho at 567.
Printz correctly sets for the standard:
Review of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal requires the appellate
court to independently consider the evidence in the record and determine whether
a reasonable mind would conclude that the defendant’s guilt as to each material
element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Erwin, 98
Idaho 736 (1977).
115 Idaho at 567 (emphasis added).
14

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wilson’s Motion For Judgment Of
Acquittal On The Persistent Violator Allegation, Because The Evidence Was Insufficient
To Support A Finding That Mr. Wilson Had Two Prior Felony Convictions
Idaho’s persistent violator statute provides for the enhancement of the penalty when a

person is convicted for the third time of a felony, and requires imposition of a term of five years
and up to life. I.C. § 19-2514. The prior convictions relied upon to invoke the persistent violator
enhancement must be alleged in the indictment or information and be proved at trial beyond a
reasonable doubt. I.C.R. 7(c); State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 232-22 (2011); State v. McClain,
154 Idaho 742, 747 (Ct. App. 2012). “The State bears the burden of identifying the defendant as
the same individual identified in the prior convictions, and the burden of identifying the prior
crimes as felonies.” McClain, 154 Idaho at 747 (emphasis added). “The State may satisfy the
latter burden by producing copies of judgments specifically identifying the crimes as felonies,
or—if the judgments were not so specific—by offering admissible copies of the felony statutes
applicable to the crimes recited in the judgments.” Id. (citations and internal brackets omitted)
(emphasis added).
In the present case, the State produced Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 to prove its allegation that
Mr. Wilson had been previously convicted of a felony in Michigan, in 1990. (Tr., p.106, L.8;
Exhibits, pp.4-8.) Exhibit 2 is a “commitment to jail,” in the State of Michigan, and reflects that
in 1990 a Mark Charles Wilson was found guilty of the crime of “criminal sexual conduct, 2nd
degree.” (Exhibits, p.4.) However, Exhibit 2 does not identify whether the crime of conviction
was a felony or misdemeanor. (Exhibits, p.4.)
State’s Exhibit 3 is a webpage from the Michigan Legislature’s website, downloaded in
September 2019. (Exhibits, pp.7-9.) The page purports to be from the “Michigan Penal Code,”
and is entitled “750.520c Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree; felony.” (Exhibits, pp.7-
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9.) However, Exhibit 3 reflected the current version of the Michigan statute as it existed at the
time of trial, not the version that existed when the conviction was entered in 1990, nearly 30
years earlier; additionally, Exhibit 3 itself shows that the Michigan Legislature amended the
statute a total of five times since the conviction was entered. (Exhibits, p.8.) (Tr., p.110, Ls.38.) Mr. Wilson submits that this evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that in 1990,
criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, was defined as a felony under Michigan law.
The State bore the burden of presenting evidence from which a jury could conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 1990 Michigan conviction was for a felony. McClain, 154
Idaho at 747. Producing a copy of the 2019 statute, especially where its “history” demonstrates
the statute was amended five times since the time of the conviction, nearly thirty years earlier,
provides no basis to support a finding that the same provisions existed in 1990. The State failed
to provide the jury with substantial evidence to prove that the 1990 Michigan conviction was for
a felony. Since the State failed to prove both of the alleged prior felony convictions beyond a
reasonable doubt, Mr. Wilson was entitled to acquittal on the persistent violator allegations. The
district court’s denial of his Criminal Rule 29 motion to acquit should therefore be reversed, and
Mr. Wilson’s case should be remanded to the district court for resentencing, without the
persistent violator enhancement.
Mr. Wilson acknowledges the Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. Smith, 116 Idaho
553, 560 (Ct. App. 1989), wherein the Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the State failed
to carry its burden when “it did not wholly eliminate a possibility that the prior crimes were
misdemeanors when he committed them.” In Smith, the Court reasoned that, “the state did not
have the burden, sua sponte, of disproving a speculative and unasserted possibility that the
statutes had been amended some time after the commissions of the crimes,” and that “in its prima
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facie presentation, the State need only to produce . . . copies of the felony statutes applicable to
the crimes recited in the judgments.” Id.
Notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Smith, Mr. Wilson argues that presenting the jury
with the text of a statute, which the legislative history shows has been amended five different
times in the thirty years since the conviction, does not constitute substantial evidence that
supports a finding that the crime was a felony under the statute at the time it was committed.
Unlike in Smith, Mr. Wilson framed this very issue when the State first offered the statute into
evidence at his trial. (Tr., p.109, L.3 - p.110, L.8). Unlike in Smith, the legislative history
submitted by the State in Mr. Wilson’s case did not “negate[] any potential defense based on
possible statutory amendments.” 116 Idaho at 560. In Mr. Wilson’s case, it is certain that the
statute had in fact been amended. Therefore, the State was obligated to present the actual version
of the statute that was in effect at the time the conviction was entered.
Moreover, the Court’s statement in Smith is manifestly wrong and should not govern in
this case. The holding is manifestly wrong because it impermissibly diminishes the State’s
burden of proving an essential element beyond a reasonable doubt, and instead creates a
rebuttable presumption, lowering the State’s burden to a mere “prima facie” showing, and then
shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove the State’s allegation on an essential element.
See State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 46 (Ct. App. 2000). In Crowe, the Court of Appeals stated,
The requirement that the State provide every element beyond a reasonable doubt
is ground in the constitutional guarantee of due process. A jury instruction that
lightens the prosecution's burden of proof by omitting an element of the crime,
creating a conclusive presumption as to an element, or shifting to the defendant
the burden of persuasion on an essential element, is impermissible.
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Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) (emphasis added); See also Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 (1975); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); State v.
Buckley, 131 Idaho 164 (1998).
Likewise, in State v. Medrain, in addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
to prove a defendant had a previous felony conviction, the Court of Appeals explained,
the law does not impose upon the defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty
of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. Our inquiry is not whether
[the defendant] disputed the state’s evidence [but rather] whether the state
produced substantial evidence upon which the jury could have found the state
sustained its burden . . . “
143 Idaho 329 (Ct. App. 2006) Id. at 332.
This particular holding in Smith is incompatible with fundamental principles of due
process and with Idaho’s well-established precedent that the State is required to prove the
elements of the alleged prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. See e.g., Miller, 151 Idaho
828, 832-33; State v. Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 332 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Cheatham, 139
Idaho 413, 416 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875, 880 (Ct. App. 1982). Because
of its impermissible lowering and shifting of State’s burden of proof, Mr. Wilson respectfully
submits that the holding in Smith is manifestly and wrong, and that it be rejected or else
overruled. See State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4 (2015).8 It should not be applied to the facts in
Mr. Wilson’s case. The State bore the burden of proofing that the crime of conviction was a
felony beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence submitted to the jury was legally insufficient
to meet that burden.

8

“Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent is
manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v.
Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4 (2015).
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully asks this Court to vacate his conviction and remand his case to
the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal. Alternatively, if this Court does not agree
that Mr. Wilson is entitled to an acquittal on the primary charge, Mr. Wilson respectfully asks
this Court to vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction and remand his case for
resentencing, without the persistent violator enhancement.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2020.
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